Assessment of Nuclear Safety Regulatory Effectiveness in Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis of Legal Frameworks, Institutional Capacity, and International Safety Standards

Abstract

Nigeria has a statutory nuclear and radiation safety regulator, a body of sector-specific regulations, and participation in major international nuclear safety instruments. The unresolved question is whether these formal arrangements provide the institutional conditions needed for effective regulation. This article assesses Nigeria’s nuclear safety regulatory framework through doctrinal and comparative legal analysis. It examines the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Act 1995; the mandate and public institutional record of the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA); International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standards; and selected regulatory models in Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, India, France, and Japan. Regulatory effectiveness is assessed through six indicators: legal authority, functional independence, authorization and enforcement capacity, technical competence, transparency, and international alignment. The evidence shows that Nigeria possesses a functioning regulatory structure with licensing, inspection, and enforcement powers, as well as an extensive radiation-safety regulatory portfolio. The NNRA also reports continuing oversight activity; for 2025, it reported 741 regulatory inspections and 1,472 authorizations. These figures demonstrate workload but cannot, without data on staffing, quality, and enforcement outcomes, establish the adequacy of regulatory capacity. The main legal concern is structural independence. The statutory and institutional arrangements place high-level executive and sectoral actors, including the Nigerian Atomic Energy Commission, within the NNRA governing structure, while IAEA standards require effective independence and functional separation from organizations whose responsibilities or interests could unduly influence safety decisions. This article does not infer actual interference from institutional design alone. It instead argues for legislative modernization, clearer safeguards for decisional and financial independence, systematic publication of regulatory performance indicators, stronger transparency regarding technical capacity, and regular peer-review follow-up. Nigeria’s regulatory system should be judged not merely by the existence of statutory powers but by whether those powers can be exercised independently, competently, consistently, and transparently.