The Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 and the Problem of State Actor Accountability in Nigeria

Abstract

Nigeria's Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 establishes an extensive legal framework for preventing, investigating, prosecuting, and punishing terrorism and related financing offenses. It also gives law-enforcement and security agencies substantial powers of arrest, search, detention, seizure, and, in urgent circumstances, action without a prior warrant. The Act develops public-official accountability for exercising those powers less directly. This article examines whether, and to what extent, Nigerian law provides an adequate framework for holding state actors accountable when counter-terrorism powers result in unlawful killing, excessive force, torture, arbitrary detention, or other violations of protected rights. The study applies doctrinal legal analysis to the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), the Anti-Torture Act 2017, relevant judicial decisions, and the legislative materials that preceded the 2022 Act. The analysis makes two distinctions. First, unlawful conduct by a state official is not necessarily an "act of terrorism" under section 2 of the 2022 Act. The statutory definition requires elements, including a specified intent, that cannot be presumed merely because the use of official force was unlawful. Secondly, the absence of a comprehensive state-actor accountability regime within the Terrorism Act does not mean that public officials enjoy general immunity. Constitutional rights, ordinary criminal and civil liability, the Anti-Torture Act, and judicial review remain applicable. Section 64(4) of the Terrorism Act itself protects an authorized officer only where the force used is necessary, proportionate, reasonable, and for a purpose in accordance with the Act. The principal difficulty is therefore one of legal asymmetry and fragmentation. The Act defines counter-terrorism powers in considerable detail, but responsibility for misuse of those powers must largely be reconstructed from legal regimes outside the Act. Judicial decisions such as Fawehinmi v Inspector-General of Police, Inspector-General of Police v All Nigeria Peoples Party, Federal Republic of Nigeria v Nnamdi Kanu, and the ECOWAS Court's decision in Abdullahi v Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria demonstrate both the availability and the limits of those external accountability mechanisms. The article argues for a clearer statutory framework that links counter-terrorism powers to independent investigation, constitutional standards governing force and detention, the preservation of evidence, individual responsibility, and effective remedies.